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CITE

DIST 1 SEPTEMBER 1967

COUNTRY NORTH VIETNAM

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DOI 11 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT PHAM VAN DONG INTERVIEW WITH MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL
TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM IN HANOI, 11 AUGUST 1967

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1. THE MEMBERS OF THE FIFTH RUSSELL TRIBUNAL INVESTIGATION TEAM WHO RECENTLY
VISITED HANOI HAD A MEETING WITH PHAM VAN DONG ON 11 AUGUST. THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS
WERE QUITE DISAPPOINTED WITH DONG'S EVASIVENESS IN HANDLING DIRECT QUESTIONS AND
HIS FAILURE TO SUPPORT WITH FACTUAL MATERIAL HIS CLAIMS THAT THE WAR WOULD BE
THE LONG RUN. DONG SPOKE ONLY OF WINNING THE WAR ALTHOUGH HE PREDICTED THAT

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WORSE TIMES WERE IN STORE FOR THE NORTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE. HE CLAIMED THAT VIETNAMESE PREPARATIONS FOR FURTHER ESCALATION BY THE AMERICANS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE. THE SUBJECT OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT TO THE WAR WAS NOT MENTIONED.

THE INVESTIGATING TEAM LEADER AYBAR SPECIFICALLY ASKED DONG IF THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE WAS INFLUENCING THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND ADDED THAT HE HAD RECENTLY ASKED KONG THE SAME QUESTION. DONG REPLIED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WERE BUSY FIGHTING THEIR OWN AND WERE NOT BEING INFLUENCED BY THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH WERE AIDING THEM. THIS OBVIOUS HEDGING ON A SERIOUS QUESTION DISAPPOINTED AYBAR.)

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DONG WAS ALSO ASKED WHETHER THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS. DONG REPLIED THAT FOREIGN VOLUNTEERS WERE NOT NEEDED. HE WAS THEN ASKED WHETHER THIS STATEMENT ALSO APPLIED TO VOLUNTEERS IN THE MEDICAL FIELD. DONG SAID, "YES FOR THE TIME BEING BUT THIS COULD CHANGE."

4. DONG BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE PLANS FOR AIDING SOUTH VIETNAM AFTER VICTORY OVER THE AMERICANS. HE SAID SUCH AID WOULD BE GIVEN IN STAGES AS REQUESTED AND REQUIRED BY THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE. DONG'S APPARENT REFUSAL TO ADMIT THE PRESENT MASSIVE NORTH VIETNAMESE SUPPORT TO THE WAR EFFORT IN SOUTH VIETNAM WAS PARTICULARLY GALLING TO THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS.)

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5. FIELD DISSEM: NONE

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